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ARE CHRISTIANS FIT TO BE PARENTS AND GUARDIANS?
THE CASE OF JOHNS V. DERBY CITY COUNCIL
Robert John Araujo, S.J.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 2011, the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
issued its decision in the case of Eunice and Owen Johns v. Derby City
Council. The court considered at length the case of an evangelical Christian
couple who had previously served and desired to serve again as foster parents
(or carers, as they are called in the United Kingdom) but whose application
had not been acted upon favorably by the relevant administrative body.2 In
refusing to grant relief, the High Court, while relying primarily on procedural
grounds,3 expounded at length on the doubts raised about the couple's views
on homosexuality, concluding that "the attitudes of potential foster carers to
sexuality are relevant.",
4
The court's decision raises the fundamental question of the status of the
freedom of religion and the educational role of parents in the context of
family life. By pressuring Mr. and Mrs. Johns to sympathize with, endorse, or
approve homosexuality, the state would force them to compromise or even
deny the tenets of their Christian faith dealing with human nature, the mores
of human sexuality, and God's design for the human person. Supporters of
the court's decision will point out that the court did not negate religious
liberty, but simply indicated that religious freedom is a "qualified" right.5 But
the qualification is based not on neutral principles but on legal standards
reflecting partisan perspectives.
6
The court went so far as to state that religious freedom is a qualified right
and "will be particularly so where a person in whose care a child is placed
' John Courtney Murray, S.J., University Professor, Loyola University, Chicago.
2 Case No: CO/4594/2010. The UK Equality and Human Rights Commission was an
intervener. [2011] EWHC 375 (Admin.).
3 The court noted that the Johns' application had not been formally rejected: "The
defendant has taken no decision and there is likely to be a broad range of factual contexts
for reaching a particular decision, the legality of which will be highly fact-sensitive." Id.
at 107.4 1d. at 109.
5 See id. at 102.
6 These points will be discussed later on in this article.
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wishes to manifest a belief that is inimical to the interests of children."7 This
is an astounding implication: that adherence to Christian values is inimical to
the interests of children. This conclusion is particularly breathtaking when
one considers that it is not only the right, but the obligation of parents-
whether foster parents or otherwise-to educate and to instruct their children
in morality and social responsibility according to their best lights. This court
has implied that those best lights may not include the light of faith. In short,
the Johns decision undermines the fundamental rights and obligations of
parents to instruct and educate the children God has entrusted to their care.
In Johns, the court undermined these rights and obligations, central to the
notion of the family as seen both by Christian faith and the Western civiliza-
tion that has grown from Christian soil-rights and obligations normally
given the full protection of the law-in the service of an agenda that can
make no such cultural claims and purported rights that have only the most
questionable legal foundation.
To put it somewhat differently, the court has indicated that children, in
order to be properly educated and nurtured, must be raised in an environment
that is not merely sympathetic to the claims and interests of the members of
the homosexual community and their actions, but is affirmatively supportive
of them.
II. THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE
The primary aspect of the court's decision that I address in this paper is that it
failed to follow the applicable law of nations. It ignored some important trea-
ties; it relied-in a partial and ill-considered way-on others; and throughout
it omitted to take account of the circumstance that, like the United States, 8 the
United Kingdom is a dualist system where treaty making and ratification of
treaties may require an additional step before the treaty becomes domestic
law. In the context of the United Kingdom, Parliament's sovereignty is
supreme; therefore Parliament must enact domestic legislation before a
ratified treaty becomes incorporated into the law of the land.
The Johns court completely overlooked the treaty law that would other-
wise be applicable in this case. In this age when international law is often
relied upon to help direct judicial decision making, the court did not
acknowledge that the United Kingdom is a party to both the International
7 Id. (italics added).
8 While Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of the
land, decisions such as Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), may require additional
legislation beyond the Senate's ratification of a treaty.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)9 and the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 10 Both of these
covenants protect religious liberty and the rights of parents in rearing and
educating their children, or children entrusted to their care, on the basis of the
parents' or guardians' moral and religious beliefs.
Article 18(4) of the ICCPR requires that States parties "have respect for
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians [such as the
Johnses] to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in
conformity with their own convictions." Article 13(3) of the ICESCR pre-
sents an almost identical requirement "to ensure the religious and moral edu-
cation of their children in conformity with their [the parents'] own convic-
tions." Neither of these covenants mentions homosexuality in this context.
The justifications for these provisions are found in the working papers of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), I which show that the
drafters of the declaration knew that they had to preserve the rights of parents
regarding the moral and religious education of their children, which had first
been compromised and then eviscerated by National Socialism.
12
With the knowledge that religious liberty and related parental rights are at
stake in this case, the doctrines of the Catholic Church are relevant and com-
pletely congruent with the principles espoused in the covenants. In 1965, one
year before the ICCPR and the ICESCR were finalized, the Second Vatican
Council, in Dignitatis Humanae Personae, the Declaration on Religious
Liberty, stated, in harbinger fashion:
Parents, moreover, have the right to determine, in accordance with their own reli-
gious beliefs, the kind of religious education that their children are to receive.
Government, in consequence, must acknowledge the right of parents to make a
genuinely free choice of schools and of other means of education, and the use of
9 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar.
23, 1976), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm
'0 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Jan. 3, 1976), available at http://www.un-
documents.net/icescr.htm
" G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/b I udhr.htm
12 Professor Johannes Morsink presents a cogent consideration of the UDHR working
papers in his book THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING & INTENT 263-269 (2000). In particular, his discussion of the rights of parents
in the context of Article 26(3) demonstrates how the drafters of this provision wanted to
prevent states, as did National Socialism, from removing from parents and guardians the
rights and responsibilities for determining the religious and moral education their child-
ren would receive.
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this freedom of choice is not to be made a reason for imposing unjust burdens on
parents, whether directly or indirectly. Besides, the rights of parents are violated, if
their children are forced to attend lessons or instructions which are not in agree-
ment with their religious beliefs, or if a single system of education, from which all
religious formation is excluded, is imposed upon all.'3
Additionally, in 1983, the Pontifical Council for the Family issued the
Charter of the Rights of the Family, and it had this to say about the issues
found in the Johns case:
a) Parents have the right to educate their children in conformity with their moral
and religious convictions, taking into account the cultural traditions of the family
which favor the good and the dignity of the child; they should also receive from
society the necessary aid and assistance to perform their educational role properly.
b) Parents have the right to freely choose schools or other means necessary to
educate their children in keeping with their convictions. Public authorities must
ensure that public subsidies are so allocated that parents are truly free to exercise
this right without incurring unjust burdens. Parents should not have to sustain,
directly or indirectly, extra charges which would deny or unjustly limit the exer-
cise of this freedom.
c) Parents have the right to ensure that their children are not compelled to attend
classes which are not in agreement with their own moral and religious convictions.
In particular, sex education is a basic right of the parents and must always be
carried out under their close supervision, whether at home or in educational
centers chosen and controlled by them. 14
If a Catholic family were to find itself in the same situation as the Johnses,
their claims would be supported by the principles of Dignitatis Humanae
Personae and the Charter of the Rights of the Family, and find resounding
support in the covenants. At this point, it is necessary to understand the
factual foundation of the Johns case and the legal dispute that arose from it.
III. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
In 2007, the Johnses, who had previously served as foster parents, applied
to be short-term foster parents once more and met with officials from the
13 Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae Personae (Decree on Religious Liberty),
n. 5, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist councils/ii vatican council/documents/vat-ii
decl 19651207 dignitatis-humanae en.html
14 Pontifical Council for the Family, Charter of the Rights of the Family (1983), art. 5,
http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/pontifical councils/family/documents/rc pc family
doc 19831022 family-rights en.html
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appropriate public authority. During their meetings with the civil authorities,
the agency officials expressed concerns about the Johnses' views on homo-
sexuality. 15 This was not an issue that had been discussed in the past nor was
it considered in previous screenings. The disagreement between the couple
and the officials began when the religious beliefs of the Johnses, who are
Pentecostal Christians, were discussed. In accordance with their Christian
beliefs, Mr. and Mrs. Johns maintained that sexual relations other than those
within a marriage between one man and one woman are morally wrong.
1 6
Mr. and Mrs. Johns expressed their opposition to homosexuality in these
words: it is "against God's laws and morals."1 7 They elaborated upon their
sexual mores by explaining that their position was founded on their Christian
religious convictions and beliefs. Mrs. Johns further indicated that they could
not support children who were "confused" about their sexuality. The hearing
officer who conducted the assessment interviews noted that Mrs. Johns had
"mentioned a visit she had made to San Francisco, in relation to it being a city
with many gay inhabitants. She commented that she did not like it and felt
uncomfortable while she was there."' 18
In her report the hearing officer stated:
I expressed my concerns regarding their views on homosexuality and said that I
felt that these did not equate with the Fostering Standards where they related to the
need to value diversity,' 9 address a child's needs in relation to their sexuality,
enhance the child's feeling of self-worth and help the child to deal with all forms
of discrimination.20 I emphasised the need for carers to value people regardless of
their sexual orientation. [Mrs. Johns] responded by saying that she could not
15 Eunice and Owen Johns v. Derby City Council, Case No: CO/4594/2010, [2011]
EWHC 375 (Admin.) (2011) (High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division) 3. The
numbers appearing in parentheses designate the numbered paragraphs of the High
Court's decision.
16 Id. 4. Previously, their religious views, including those on sexual mores, had not
precluded the couple from being approved to serve as foster parents, and they had so
served from August 1992 to January 1995. Id.
17[d. 6.
18 Id.
19 An examination of the standards used by the state in the Johns case reveals that the
meaning of the term diversity is elusive.
20 The court saw no need to distinguish between unjust and just discrimination. Not all
discrimination is unjust, but some is. Licensing agencies discriminate when they deny an
unqualified person from receiving a privilege that requires demonstration of competence,
but this discrimination is not unjust. Schools discriminate among students when different
grades are assigned based on the quality of academic performance, but this discrimination
is not unjust.
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compromise her beliefs, but that she did value people as individuals and would be
able to support a young person on that basis. [Mrs. Johns] informed me that her
nephew, who lived in the U.S., is gay, and that she has been to stay with him and
his partner, and had not treated them any differently from anyone else ( 7).
In addition, the hearing officer presented four scenarios in which she asked
the Johnses whether they could support a child in any of the following
contexts:
Context 1: Someone who is confused about his (or her) sexuality and may be gay;
Context 2: A child who is being bullied in school regarding sexual orientation;
Context 3: A child who bullies others regarding their sexual orientation; and,
Context 4: Someone in their care whose parents are gay ( 7).
In the first context, Mrs. Johns stated that she would support any child. She
did not offer any explanation as to how she would go about this. When Mr.
Johns was asked this question, he responded by saying that he would "gently
turn them round." In the second context, Mrs. Johns said she would give
reassurance and tell the child to ignore it. In response to the third context,
Mrs. Johns stated that she did not know what she would do. In the case of
someone whose parents are gay, she believed that it would not matter, and
that she would work with anyone ( 7 7-8).
The officer stated in her report that she believed Mrs. Johns's responses
were "somewhat superficial"; moreover, the officer thought that Mrs. Johns
downplayed how her strong religious beliefs would affect her work with
children ( 7). But the record also demonstrates that Mrs. Johns had assured a
social worker that she would never impose her beliefs on a child or denigrate
the parents for their lifestyle or sexual orientation (7 7). In regards to Mr.
Johns's responses, the hearing officer thought "particularly revealing" his
statement about turning the child around (7 8). In other words, the hearing
officer viewed as problematic any effort on his part in trying to assist a child
away from homosexuality or homosexual inclinations.
The court noted that during the six assessment sessions conducted by the
hearing officer, the issue of how the couple's religious convictions would affect
their care for children was often discussed. The Johnses indicated that a child
might need to come to church services ( 9). Both the officer and the Johnses
understood that this might limit "which children could be placed with them"
(7 9). 21 In accordance with the regulatory scheme, the civil authorities informed
21 The court noted elsewhere that in the case involving a Muslim child, it would be
understandable if the child were only placed with a Muslim couple ( 95). If this is the
case with Muslims, it would follow that Christian children be placed with Christian
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Mrs. Johns as early as August 2007 that the current application to serve as
foster parents faced "difficulty" in "the light of their views on sexuality." They
were then told that they could "withdraw their application" (7 9). If this were a
tipping of the hand designed to reveal the outcome of their application, the
Johnses were not deterred, because they requested that their application
proceed to the next level of assessment, that is, the Fostering Panel ( 9).
During this stage of the review, an official from the Fostering Panel
informed the couple that their views on same-sex relations "did not equate
with the Fostering Standards which require carers to value individuals equally
and to promote diversity" ( 10).22 The court, however, did not discuss what
constitutes "diversity." The Fostering Panel officer noted that Mrs. Johns "felt
that her beliefs would not affect how she was able to care for a young person,
and stated that we were really saying that they could not be foster-carers
because they are Christians" (7 10). It was then entered in the official records
that, "The department needs to be careful not to appear to discriminate against
them on religious grounds. The issue has not arisen just because of their
religion as there are homophobic people that are non-Christian. The ability to
promote diversity is the main issue" ( 11). With the greatest of transparency
and honesty, Mrs. Johns stated that, "I will not lie and tell you I will say it is
ok to be a homosexual. I will love and respect, no matter what sexuality. I
cannot lie and I cannot hate, but I cannot tell a child that it is ok to be homo-
sexual. Then you will not be able to trust me. There has got to be different
ways of going through this without having to compromise my faith" ( 11).
Mrs. Johns's sincere expression would ultimately be rejected.
At this point the Fostering Panel erroneously assumed that the Johnses
would be withdrawing their application (7 12). But the Johnses notified the
panel in February 2008 of their intent to proceed with their application ( 12).
In presenting their notification, the couple raised their concern that the civil
authorities considered the couple's Christian perspective on sexual orientation
would likely prohibit their being foster parents again; consequently, Mr. and
Mrs. Johns registered their unease ( 12).
However, the civil authority subsequently informed the Johnses that their
application had been reinstated and that the previous negative recommenda-
tion was not based on the couple's religious beliefs (7 13). The Johnses then
wrote a letter to the Derby City Council asking to be informed about "whether
in Derby City Council's view, 'Christians,' holding our views on sexual
ethics, as a section of the public, are suitable persons for fostering children"
couples; however, the court did not make this observation or acknowledge this
connection.
22 Fostering standards are quoted and cited in note 34, infra, and accompanying text.
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(T 14). In another letter, the Johnses asked for clarification of whether the
standards for foster parents would lead to the conclusion that "Christians and
other faith groups who hold the view that any sexual union outside a marriage
between a man and a woman is morally reprehensible are persons who are
unfit to foster" ( 15). The Johnses were troubled that they could "only adopt
if we compromise our beliefs regarding sexual ethics" ( 15). The civil
authority responded by stating that it had no policy "which states that
Christians can only foster if they compromise their beliefs on sexual ethics"
( 15).
An assessment report was then prepared on the revived application and
acknowledged that the couple are "kind and hospitable people, who would
always do their best to make a child welcome and comfortable"; nevertheless,
the report further stated that their "views on same sex relationships, which are
not in line with the current requirements of the National Standards, and which
are not susceptible to change, will need to be considered when panel reaches
its conclusion" (T 16). This latter statement was something of a smoking gun
in that it implies that compliance with the standards may well require sym-
pathy with homosexuality.
The Fostering Panel concluded that it would not decide on the application
but would defer a decision (T 17). In April 2010, the Secretaries of State for
Health and for Communities and for Local Government were informed of the
Johns application and were invited to intervene; however, they declined to do
so (T 18). But the Equality and Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, the
Commission) notified the parties of its intention to intervene in September
2010 (T 18).
A hearing on the Johns application was held on November 1, 2010, before
the High Court (T 19). The court noted the uniqueness of the case because
there was no lower decision to review-only "a decision to defer a decision"
(T 21). The court asserted that neither party had filed evidence addressing the
legal issues associated with the application ( 22). Nonetheless, the court was
of the opinion that the intervening Commission, by supplying certain
documents, had filed evidence regarding "the impact of views opposed to,
and disapproving of, same sex relationships and lifestyles on the development
and well-being of children and young people, including gay and lesbian
children and young people" (T 23). This evidence included more than two
hundred pages of documentation consisting of:
"Social exclusion of young lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people
in Europe," written by Judit Tak~cs on behalf of ILGA Europe (the European
Region of the International Lesbian and Gay Association) and IGLYO (the
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer Youth and Student
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Organisation) and published with the support of the European Commission The
European Union against discrimination in April 2006, and "Young lesbian, gay
and bisexual (LGB) people," a briefing for health and social care staff written by
Dr Julie Fish as part of the Department of Health's Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity Advisory Group's work programme and published by the Department of
Health in 2007 ( 23).
At this point, it is important to take stock of the orientation of this litera-
ture on orientation, i.e., whose perspective it represents or reflects. Counsel
for the Johnses characterized this evidence as "highly controversial" and
provided other research material, "much of it apparently emanating from
North America" ( 24). In essence, the Johnses did the same thing that the
intervening Commission had done. Curiously, the court stated that it was not
in any position to evaluate "any of this material"; moreover, there was no
need, in its opinion, to do so ( 25).
Since both parties stated that they were seeking a declaration from the
court regarding the Johns application ( 26), the court requested that each
party formulate a text of the declaration that they were, respectively, seeking
( 27). The Johnses presented a declaration containing four elements ( 27):
[1.] Persons who adhere to a traditional code of sexual ethics, according to which
any sexual union outside marriage (understood as a lifelong relationship of fidelity
between a man and a woman) is morally undesirable, should not be considered
unsuitable to be foster carers for this reason alone. This is a correct application of
the National Minimum Standards 7 "Valuing Diversity."
[2.] Persons who attend Church services at a mainstream denomination are, in
principle, suitable to be foster carers.
[3.] It is unlawful for a Foster Service to ask potential foster carers their views on
homosexuality absent the needs of a specific child.
[4.] It is unlawful for a public authority to describe religious adherents who adhere
to a code of moral sexual ethics, namely: that any sexual union outside marriage
between a man and a woman in a lifetime relationship of fidelity is morally
undesirable, as "homophobic."
The declaration sought by the civil authority included the following
request ( 28):
A fostering service provider may be acting lawfully if it decides not [to] approve a
prospective foster carer who evinces antipathy, objection to, or disapproval of,
homosexuality and same-sex relationships and an inability to respect, value and
demonstrate positive attitudes towards homosexuality and same-sex relationships.
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The intervening Commission was of the view that these requests for a
declaration were inappropriate as no decision had yet been made by the civil
authorities and the need for additional information about the background of
the applicants might still exist; moreover, it would be difficult to formulate
any useful declaration that would help the parties and other public authorities
addressing the issues that were presented in the Johns application ( 29).
Acknowledging the concerns that both the Commission and the court had
in granting a declaration, the court, notwithstanding its "misgivings about the
exercise of the jurisdiction to consider whether to grant any (and if so what)
declaratory relief' ( 107), ultimately issued a conclusion and order on
February 28, 2011. It decided the case by stating that it would issue no order
but would deny the claimants permission to appeal ( 109).
The practical result of this denial of an appeal was to reject the application
of Mr. and Mrs. Johns to serve once again as foster carers. In denying per-
mission to appeal, the court stated that "contrary to the submissions on behalf
of the claimants, our conclusions [are] that the attitudes of potential foster
carers to sexuality are relevant when considering an application ... " ( 109).
The court stated that the Johnses were "clearly protected against direct and
indirect discrimination based on their religious beliefs. [But] [t]he question is
whether the treatment of their application by the defendant is because of their
stance on sexuality or sexual orientation or because of their religious beliefs"
( 98).
By distinguishing between matters of religious belief and stances on
sexuality and sexual orientation, the court denied the possibility that the two
matters can be related. In fact, they are inextricably related and must be con-
sidered, to use a phrase of Mrs. Johns, in the light of "God's laws and morals"
( 6). The two matters might be separate and distinct for the court, but they
surely were not for Mr. and Mrs. Johns.
IV. ISSUES/MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE HIGH COURT
In its opinion, the court focused its attention on several important matters: the
relevance of the Fostering Standards; the role of religion in life and the law;
the question of discrimination; the good of and for children; and the
overarching questions dealing with equality. At the outset of its consideration
of the law, the court offered a critical observation:
[W]e emphasize that this case is, in our judgment, at the very outer limit of what
could be an appropriate exercise of our jurisdiction. In the event, and for the
reasons we give below, this is not, however, a case in which we are prepared to
grant the claimants permission to apply for judicial review ( 31).
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The court first considered the role of religion in several contexts.
Undoubtedly, the judges recognized the important roles that religion has in
both public and private life. It then noted that it did not doubt the sincerity of
Mr. and Mrs. Johns regarding the views they hold; but the judges concluded
that the couple's religious beliefs had little to do with the legal issues ( 32).
As the court stated,
We are simply not here concerned with the grant or denial of State "benefits" to
the claimants. No one is asserting that Christians (or, for that matter, Jews or
Muslims) are not "fit and proper" persons to foster or adopt. No one is contending
for a blanket ban. No one is seeking to de-legitimise Christianity or any other faith
or belief. No one is seeking to force Christians or adherents of other faiths into the
closet. No one is asserting that the claimants are bigots. No one is seeking to give
Christians, Jews or Muslims or, indeed, peoples of any faith, a second class status.
On the contrary, it is fundamental to our law, to our polity and to our way of life,
that everyone is equal: equal before the law and equal as a human being endowed
with reason and entitled to dignity and respect ( 34).
Returning to the matter of the relation between religion and homosexual-
ity, the court suggested that various religious communities and persons
express different opinions about the propriety of same-sex relationships (
35). The court also proffered its views about the role of religion in society and
public life by claiming that the relationship is not well understood but that the
United Kingdom is "a democratic and pluralistic society" and is "a secular
state and not a theocracy" ( 36).
The court then presented an overview of the relationship between religion
and the legal system in British life. In the context of the common law, the
court recalled the country's national history was "part of the Christian west,"
but it concluded that, due to "enormous changes in the social and religious
life of our country over the last century," British society is now "pluralistic
and largely secular" ( 38). While the judges acknowledged their sworn duty
to "do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm,
without fear or favour, affection or ill will," they also declared that their
obligations are exercised in a dominion where "the laws and usages of the
realm do not include Christianity, in whatever form" ( 39). This is an
interesting assertion in view of the fact that the realm has a state church. Of
further significance is the fact that the law of this very realm, the Act of
Settlement of 1701, places religious requirements and limitations on who may
wear the crown and who the sovereign may not marry on the basis of religion.
Nevertheless, these secular judges asserted that, "The aphorism that 'Christ-
ianity is part of the common law of England' is mere rhetoric; at least since
the decision of the House of Lords in Bowman v Secular Society Limited
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[1917] AC 406, it has been impossible to contend that it is law" ( 39). This is
a whimsical explanation of the relationship between religion and the state.
The court then moved on to a consideration of Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),23 which is a part of the law of the
United Kingdom as it is a member of the European Union. In this context, the
court noted that "a secular judge must be wary of straying across the well-
recognised divide between church and state" ( 41). However, major issues
await in the fabric of this statement when it is made by judges who are legal
officials of a state with an established church and who preside over a legal
system that prefers or permits certain religions over others, as the Act of
Settlement demonstrates. It is therefore difficult to understand the court's
statement that:
The court recognises no religious distinctions and generally speaking passes no
judgment on religious beliefs or on the tenets, doctrines or rules of any particular
section of society. All are entitled to equal respect. And the civil courts are not
concerned to adjudicate on purely religious issues, whether religious controversies
within a religious community or between different religious communities ( 41).
It is one thing to state that the civil authorities will not "intervene in
matters of religion" or religious communities ( 42), but it is quite a different
matter to assert that the civil authorities are indifferent to religion. Yet the
court admitted that religion and religious belief do not "immunise the believer
from the reach of the secular law. And invocation of religious belief does not
necessarily provide a defence to what is otherwise a valid claim" ( 43). The
court identified one area in which religion would be under particular scrutiny,
that is, religious practices "contrary to a child's welfare" ( 44). Here the
court likely had in mind the religious views of the Johnses on sexuality and
sexual activity.
Returning to Article 9 of the ECHR, we need to recall its content:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
23 European Convention on Human Rights, Sept. 21, 1970, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter
ECHR], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-
B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ENG CONV.pdf
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2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such lim-
itations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.2 4
It is pertinent to note here that these provisions parallel those of the UDHR
(Article 18)25 and the ICCPR (Article 18).26 Of course, what these and all
other provisions in these texts fail to do is to provide a mechanism on how to
adjudicate between competing claims when religious rights compete with
other rights also expressly stated in these texts. The UDHR and the ICCPR,
along with other human rights instruments, do not provide a solution to
competing claims. But I would suggest a mechanism here that is established
on the natural law tradition. This mechanism is founded on the principles that
the human person is intelligent and has the capacity to comprehend the
intelligible reality that surrounds all members of the human family. It would
be this combination of intelligence (established on objective reason) and the
comprehension of the competing claims that are asserted in this conflict that
would be most useful in determining which claims might take precedence
when claims conflict.
In its assessment of the application of Article 9, the court asserted that the
ECHR protects only "religions and philosophies" that are "worthy of respect
in a 'democratic society' and are not incompatible with human dignity"
( 47).27 The standard for making the determination of what is and what is not
worthy of respect in a democratic society is ambiguous at best. While
24 Id., art. 9 (italics added).
25 UDHR, supra note 11.
26 ICCPR, supra note 9.
27 Here the court cites Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom (No 2) 4 EUR. HUM.
RTS. REP. 293 36 (1982). The competing claims in Campbell and Cosans dealt with the
use of corporal punishment administered to children in state schools in Scotland. In this
case the court found that the parents of the disciplined children had and exercised views
that relate to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour, namely the
integrity of the person, the propriety or otherwise of the infliction of corporal punishment
and the exclusion of the distress which the risk of such punishment entails. They are views
which satisfy each of the various criteria listed above; it is this that distinguishes them from
opinions that might be held on other methods of discipline or on discipline in general.
The philosophies in Campbell and Cosans under scrutiny were those dealing with the
propriety of corporal punishment. The "philosophy" in the Johns case deals with reli-
gious beliefs that pertain to the moral upbringing of children. It cannot be said that human
rights instruments are protective of corporal punishment, but it cannot be denied that they
are protective of religious beliefs and the rights of parents and guardians to raise children
in accordance with these beliefs and the moral outlooks that they contain.
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hastening to add that the religious beliefs of the Johnses are "clearly worthy
of respect" ( 47), the court further acknowledged that a person's manifesta-
tions of religious belief are simultaneously subject to the "overriding qualifi-
cation" of subsection 2 of Article 9. The court claimed to protect religion in
the context that it is "forbidden" to evaluate the validity of religious beliefs;
however, the court was compelled to state that it must remain above all else
neutral and impartial in such matters ( 48). In this regard, it quoted one
European decision holding that the freedom of thought, religion, and con-
science is "a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the uncon-
cerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has
been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it" ( 49).28 Interestingly, the
European court did not included religious believers in this part of its
discussion-only atheists, agnostics, skeptics, and the unconcerned were
mentioned. Christians like Mr. and Mrs. Johns were not.
The Johns court then addressed religious matters in the context of discri-
mination law. The substance of this segment of the court's opinion focused on
the opinion in McFarlane v. Relate Avon Limited 9 (a case brought by a
relationship counselor dismissed from his post for refusing to counsel same-
sex couples on sexual matters because of his Christian beliefs), quoting Judge
Laws in that case, who asserted that
judges have never, so far as I know, sought to equate the condemnation by some
Christians of homosexuality on religious grounds with homophobia, or to regard
that position as disreputable, nor have they likened Christians to bigots. They
administer the law in accordance with the judicial oath, without fear or favour,
affection or ill will ( 53).
Judge Laws continued:
In a free constitution such as ours there is an important distinction to be drawn
between the law's protection of the right to hold and express a belief and the law's
protection of that belief s substance or content. The common law and ECHR
Article 9 offer vigorous protection of the Christian's right and every other person's
right to hold and express his or her beliefs, and so they should. By contrast, they
do not, and should not, offer any protection whatever of the substance or content
of those beliefs on the ground only that they are based on religious precepts. These
are twin conditions of a free society. The first of these conditions is largely
uncontentious. I should say a little more, however, about the second. The general
law may of course protect a particular social or moral position which is espoused
28 Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 44 EUR. HUM. RTS. REP. 912, 57
(2006).
29 [2010] EWCA Civ 880, [2010] IRLR 872 (Court of Appeal, Civil Division).
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by Christianity, not because of its religious imprimatur, but on the footing that in
reason its merits commend themselves. So it is with core provisions of the
criminal law, the prohibition of violence and dishonesty. The Judea-Christian
tradition, stretching over many centuries, has no doubt exerted a profound influ-
ence upon the judgment of law-makers as to the objective merits of this or that
social policy, and the liturgy and practice of the established church are to some
extent prescribed by law. But the conferment of any legal protection or preference
upon a particular substantive moral position on the ground only that it is espoused
by the adherents of a particular faith, however long its tradition, however rich its
culture, is deeply unprincipled; it imposes compulsory law not to advance the
general good on objective grounds, but to give effect to the force of subjective
opinion. This must be so, since, in the eye of everyone save the believer, religious
faith is necessarily subjective, being incommunicable by any kind of proof or
evidence. It may, of course, be true, but the ascertainment of such a truth lies
beyond the means by which laws are made in a reasonable society. Therefore it
lies only in the heart of the believer who is alone bound by it; no one else is or can
be so bound, unless by his own free choice he accepts its claims.
The promulgation of law for the protection of a position held purely on
religious grounds cannot therefore be justified; it is irrational, as preferring the
subjective over the objective, but it is also divisive, capricious and arbitrary. We
do not live in a society where all the people share uniform religious beliefs. The
precepts of any one religion, any belief system, cannot, by force of their religious
origins, sound any louder in the general law than the precepts of any other. If they
did, those out in the cold would be less than citizens and our constitution would be
on the way to a theocracy, which is of necessity autocratic. The law of a theocracy
is dictated without option to the people, not made by their judges and govern-
ments. The individual conscience is free to accept such dictated law, but the State,
if its people are to be free, has the burdensome duty of thinking for itself.
So it is that the law must firmly safeguard the right to hold and express
religious beliefs. Equally firmly, it must eschew any protection of such a belief's
content in the name only of its religious credentials. Both principles are necessary
conditions of a free and rational regime ( 55, italics added).
The Johns court simply added, "We respectfully and emphatically agree
with every word of that" ( 55). The rationale of Judge Laws is problematic,
as is the Johns court's reliance on it. But an immediate problem of Judge
Laws' position begins to surface: while he recognizes the right to express
religious belief on the one hand, he disavows this right on the other when he
asserts that religious expression is not protected because the belief itself is
based on "religious precepts." Rhetorically, I ask, on what other basis would
religious beliefs be based other than on "religious precepts"? But I do not stop
here, for it becomes clear that Mr. McFarlane's religious beliefs reflect a
reasoned and objective understanding of the nature and the essence of the
human person that takes stock of the complementarity of the sexes. Judge
Laws' decision upon which the Johns court relies is devoid of this recogni-
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tion. The position taken by Mr. McFarlane is not a "subjective opinion" as
Judge Laws contends, for it is based on the facts of the human sexes that
determine their complementarity. While Judge Laws recognizes the impor-
tance of protecting religious belief on the one hand, he disavows that protec-
tion on the other with the spurious claim that the religious belief is devoid of
anything other than religion. In short, his rationale leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the right of religious believers and the protections that are to
be accorded to them may exist in principle but not in fact.
But there are further weaknesses in Judge Laws' rationale that need to be
pointed out here and that undermine the reliance of the Johns court on his
argument. While claiming that religious belief may be established on some
truth, Judge Laws asserts that "the ascertainment of such a truth lies beyond
the means by which laws are made in a reasonable society." Clearly, he has
forgotten how the Fifth through Tenth Commandments of the Decalogue have
had an impact on virtually every legal system of the world. Yet he assumes
the "truth" of the beliefs of the same-sex couple and their understanding of
human nature, which is subjective. He does not subject these beliefs to the
same scrutiny that he applies to the rights of religious believers whose views
are clearly protected under the applicable juridical instruments. If, as he
suggests, the "truth" of the religious believer "lies only in the heart of the
believer who is alone bound by it," how can it then be claimed that the beliefs
surrounding same-sex relations must be honored by Mr. McFarlane even
though he holds contrary views?
Judge Laws offers no answer, but he rationalizes his perspective with the
claim that the "promulgation of law for the protection of a position held
purely on religious grounds cannot ... be justified." Why? His defense of this
position is that the religious view is an irrational one that prefers "the
subjective over the objective." If that is the case, which it is not when one
considers that Mr. McFarlane's religious views on human sexuality reflect the
objective reality of the complementarity of the sexes, Judge Laws should see
that those who insist on the acceptability and preference for same-sex
relations, in fact, base their position on the subjective rather than the
objective. To demonstrate this, one need only consider the subjective standard
adopted by a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, ° when Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy declared that the
heart of liberty "is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 31 If the skeptic
were to point out that Casey was a case dealing with abortion access rather
30 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
"' 505 U.S. at 851.
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than same-sex relations, it must be recalled that Casey was pivotal to the
decisions that did deal with the protection of same-sex relations in Lawrence
v. Texas32 (the decriminalizing of same-sex sodomy) and Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health33 (the legalization of same-sex marriage in
Massachusetts). It is patent that by linking the "legitimacy" of same-sex rela-
tions to a liberty based on a subjective standard, Judge Laws has justified his
view on the "irrational" because his rationale ultimately prefers the subjective
over the objective.
Judge Laws further asserts that the religious perspective is "also divisive,
capricious and arbitrary." But if the divisive, capricious, and arbitrary are
factors for consideration in important judicial reasoning, one must apply these
concerns uniformly and consider the perspective that advocates the legitimacy
of and preference for same-sex relations. Are they not also divisive, capri-
cious, and arbitrary? Judge Laws is correct when he states that "we do not
live in a society where all the people share uniform religious beliefs." No
particular religion can "by force of [its] religious origins, sound any louder in
the general law than the precepts of any other." If one voice did predominate,
then it would be, recalling his words, "theocratic" and "autocratic." But when
the religious voice is purged from the public square because it is religious,
and is then replaced with a particular view about human sexuality to which
the religious perspective must conform, is that not also autocratic?
It was at this point that the High Court framed and addressed the issues it
identified regarding the claims of Mr. and Mrs. Johns and the counterclaims
of the state. The issues the court identified were these: (1) Are the Johnses'
Christian beliefs dealing with human sexuality relevant or not to their ability
to serve as foster parents? (2) Does the position of the civil authority
defendant constitute religious discrimination contrary to Article 9 of the
ECHR? (3) Related to the previous issue is the possibility that a "majority of
32 539 U.S. at 573 574 (2003), "The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."
440 Mass. at 312 (2003), "We are mindful that our decision marks a change in the
history of our marriage law. Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical
convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one man and one woman, and
that homosexual conduct is immoral. Many hold equally strong religious, moral, and
ethical convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that homosexual
persons should be treated no differently than their heterosexual neighbors. Neither view
answers the question before us. Our concern is with the Massachusetts Constitution as a
charter of governance for every person properly within its reach. 'Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."' Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 567 (2003), quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
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the population" would be unreasonably excluded from fostering if they hold
beliefs about human sexuality that coincide with the beliefs of the Johnses (
57).
The court then considered the framework of the laws and regulations
dealing with foster parents and bearing on the Johns case. In particular, it
concluded that the Fostering Services Regulations had particular relevance.
Regulation 27(2) required that the government agency consider the prospec-
tive foster parents' "religious persuasion, and ... capacity to care for a child
from any particular religious persuasion" and their "racial origin ... cultural
and linguistic background and ... capacity to care for a child from any
particular origin or cultural or linguistic background" ( 65).
Compare this to the court's statement in 95 that under the Equality Act
2010 "a Muslim family could agree to foster only Muslim children." If a
Muslim couple could do this, what would prevent a devout Christian couple
like the Johns from doing the same, i.e., foster a Christian child who may
have been reared with the moral upbringing shared by Mr. and Mrs. Johns? If
accommodation can be made for a Muslim family, it should also be made for
a Christian family. If the court refused to do this, its decision would be
unreasonably and unjustly discriminatory.
The court also acknowledged the relevance of the National Minimum
Standards for Fostering Services published by the Secretary of State for
Health under section 23 of the Children Act 1989 and section 23 of the Care
Standards Act 2000.34 These are considered to be minimum standards rather
than "best possible" practice ( 68). The court identified the following
standards as being relevant to the Johns case:
7.1 The fostering service ensures that children and young people, and their
families, are provided with foster care services which value diversity and promote
equality.
7.2 Each child and her/his family have access to foster care services which
recognise and address her/his needs in terms of gender, religion, ethnic origin,
language, culture, disability and sexuality....
7.3 The fostering service ensures that foster carers and social workers work
cooperatively to enhance the child's confidence andfeeling of self-worth ...
34 Here and throughout, the court's references are to standards then in effect. See Depart-
ment of Health, Fostering Services: National Minimum Standards: Fostering Services
Regulations 12 (2002), http://www.crin.org/docs/fostering%/o20services%/o20national%/o20
minimum%20standards.pdf. The relationship between the National Minimum Standards
and the Fostering Service Regulations is discussed at p. vii of the Department of Health
document. See Fostering Services Regulations 2002/57, Part IV Approval of Foster
Parents (version in force from 2002 to 2011), available on Westlaw.
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7.5 The fostering service ensures that their foster carers support and encourage
each child to develop skills to help her/him to deal with all forms of discrimination
... ( 69, italics added).
Applicable provisions from standard 8 include:
8.1 Local authority fostering services, and voluntary agencies placing children in
their own right, ensure that each child or young person placed in foster care is
carefully matched with a carer capable of meeting her/his assessed needs. For
agencies providing foster carers to local authorities, these agencies ensure that
they offer carers only if they represent appropriate matches for a child for whom a
local authority is seeking a carer.
8.5 Placement decisions consider the child's assessed racial, ethnic, religious,
cultural and linguistic needs and matches these as closely as possible with the
ethnic origin, race, religion, culture and language of the foster family (see 69).
Additional norms cited by the court include: the Statutory Guidance on
Promoting the Health and Well-Being of Looked-After Children. The
relevant provisions appear in paragraphs 6.1.2 and 6.1.5 of the Practice Guid-
ance, under the heading "Promoting healthy relationships and sexual health."
These provisions require that children "gain the self esteem and skills needed
to develop loving, respectful and safe relationships." In this regard, support
for teenage sexual health should be provided to all young people "regardless
of their sexual orientation or preference and should not be affected by" the
"personal views" of those who supervise them ( 70). Moreover, the stan-
dards require that children and young people "are entitled to clear, relevant,
age appropriate information which is accurate and non-judgmental." Further,
children and young people "can be helped to develop a positive attitude to
sexual health and well being" by "exploring and challenging attitudes, values
and beliefs" ( 70). In overview, these regulations do not appear to support
the teaching and maintaining of traditional sexual mores espoused by
Christians like the Johnses. Moreover, they appear to reinforce protection of
sexual promiscuity that is engendered by exaggerated autonomy. These
standards do not assist children in understanding the distinctions between
right and wrong, good and evil, true and false, or virtue and vice.
The relevance of highlighting these regulations goes to the heart of this
essay, for they address a fundamental issue: the nexus between family life and
education. The relationship of family life and the education that takes place
within it is assuredly related to the welfare of children-what is appropriate
and what is not; what is "inimical" and what is not. What is good and what is
bad for the welfare of children is at the center of the dispute between the
parties and the intervener. Indeed, standards will have to apply to the selec-
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tion and appointment of foster parents. However, it would be logical to con-
clude that the standards can be interpreted and applied in light of international
standards cited in this essay that also have the welfare of parents, guardians,
and children simultaneously in mind. We must not forget that the Johnses
wished to care for the children placed in their custody in a manner that
reflected Christian morality. And this approach to providing guardianship of
young people is protected by international standards that respect the views of
people like Mr. and Mrs. Johns.
In the context of this issue, the court found an opportunity to question the
role of religion in children's welfare by considering two other British cases.
These were Islington London Borough Council v. Ladele, [2009] EWCA Civ
1357, [2010] 1 WLR 955, and McFarlane v. Relate Avon Limited, [2010]
EWCA Civ 880, [2010] IRLR 872. 35 In Ladele, a registrar had objected on
religious grounds to perform same-sex marriages. She was disciplined by the
local authority for refusing to perform civil partnership ceremonies. Her
religious discrimination complaint was dismissed. The court in Johns finds
persuasive the Ladele finding that
if [the registrar] had been willing to carry out the ceremony ... then no further
action would be taken against her. She would then have been doing what was
required of her. She could have kept her objection to same sex relationships, and
there would have been no action taken against her merely because that was her
view.
This is further supported by the fact that no action was taken against another
employee who shared the same religious views but who accepted a different role
which did not place her in this dilemma. Had the council's objection been to the
belief itself, then logically she should have been disciplined anyway. We can see
no real evidence which begins to justify an inference that the claimant was sub-
jected to disciplinary action because of her beliefs rather because she insisted on
giving effect to those beliefs by refusing to participate in civil partnership work.
... However, the issue is not ... a matter of giving equal respect to the religious
rights of the claimant and the rights of the gay community. It is whether, given the
legitimate aim, the means adopted by the council to achieve that aim were
proportional ( 75, italics added).
In short, the Ladele decision points out that one can be discriminated
against on religious grounds, but it would be impermissible to discriminate on
the grounds of beliefs and practices of those who are of same-sex orientation.
It is crucial to understand that religious belief and its practice were sacrificed
35 The descriptions of the Ladele and McFarlane cases that follow, and quotations from
those cases, are as presented by the court in the Johns case, and the citations refer to
paragraphs in the Johns case.
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when the court in Ladele failed to make the connection between the com-
plainant's religious belief and her being punished for wanting to protect it in
her public life. Surely there were other officials who could have performed
the same-sex ceremony? When it comes to religious views, it seems that they
are to be held privately and are subject to restriction or denial when exercised
in a public fashion, especially when religion comes in conflict with sexual
mores; moreover, the religious perspective, specifically the Christian one,
does not appear to be appropriate for educating other members of society,
especially children. This conflict and concern go to the heart of the matter in
the Johns case.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in the Ladele case, Lord
Neuberger stating:
Ms Ladele was employed in a public job and was working for a public authority;
she was being required to perform a purely secular task, which was being treated
as part of her job; Ms Ladele's refusal to perform that task involved discriminating
against gay people in the course of that job; she was being asked to perform the
task because of Islington's Dignity for All policy, whose laudable aim was to
avoid, or at least minimise, discrimination both among Islington's employees, and
as between Islington (and its employees) and those in the community they served;
Ms Ladele's refusal was causing offence to at least two of her gay colleagues; Ms
Ladele's objection was based on her view of marriage, which was not a core part
of her religion; and Islington's requirement in no way prevented her from
worshipping as she wished ( 78).
Again, we see that a tribunal misunderstands the nature of how moral per-
spectives can be informed by religious beliefs. Moreover, we see that some
courts view religious belief and practice as an essentially private matter that
cannot extend into a person's public life in the society in which people like
Ms. Ladele live. Yet, specifically with regard to Ms. Ladele's religious rights
under Article 9 of the ECHR, Lord Neuberger stated that they were "quali-
fied" and that her wish to have her religious beliefs respected could not
override the public authority's concern "to ensure that all its registrars
manifest equal respect for the homosexual community as for the heterosexual
community" ( 79). Of course this attitude begs the question of whether
members of the homosexual community must have an equal respect for
members of the heterosexual and religious communities. More importantly in
the context of public authorities, including tribunals, it would be essential to
conclude that the institutions of the servant state, including its courts, must
also accord equal respect to the heterosexual and religious communities. But
in the context of the cases relied on by the Johns court, this is not the case.
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Nevertheless, the case of the Johnses extends beyond the question of
respect. It goes to the heart of a specified group of rights that involve the
protection of religious persons and the rights they must be able to enjoy,
including the moral education and environment they offer to children legiti-
mately in their care.
The McFarlane case involved a publicly employed marriage counselor
who was disciplined for objecting, on religious grounds, to provide "psycho-
sexual therapy" (PST) to homosexual couples ( 80). The outcome of this
case was similar to that in Ladele. In McFarlane, the court denied that there
was actionable religious discrimination in that, "the reason why the Claimant
was treated as he was was not because of his Christian faith but because of his
perceived unwillingness to provide PST counselling to same-sex couples, and
thus-this being the other side of the same coin-that he was treated in the
same way as any non-Christian who had evinced such an unwillingness" (
81). As in Ladele, the McFarlane court made a distinction between the
private religious belief and the public manifestation of it by concluding that
the employee does not have an unqualified right to manifest religion; accor-
dingly, there are some circumstances in which manifestation may be pro-
tected but there are other situations where it is not ( 81-82). The difficulty
in accepting this judicial rationale is this: by what standard is the court's
rationale to be applied; i.e., how can a claim of religious discrimination be
upheld as meritorious? Under what circumstances will the religious rights
protected by law be upheld and when will they be sacrificed?
The High Court in Johns then turned to the question about the views of
applicants on human sexuality ( 90). The Johnses asserted that that their
views on sexuality are not a legitimate fostering concern and that the only
legitimate fostering concern by which they are bound is the protection of the
welfare of the child ( 90). However, the court expressed the view that the
sexuality and sexual orientation of children-albeit in abstracto-is of
relevance when making foster parent assignments. As the court stated, "If
children, whether they are known to be homosexuals or not, are placed with
carers who ... evince an antipathy, objection to or disapproval of, homosexu-
ality and same-sex relationships, there may well be a conflict with the local
authority's duty to 'safeguard and promote' the 'welfare' of looked-after
children" ( 93, italics added).
Here, it is relevant and imperative to point out the distinction between
"there may well be a conflict" and "there is a conflict." The court did not take
stock of this crucial distinction, rather, it continued with this remarkable
claim:
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While as between the protected rights concerning religion and sexual orientation
there is no hierarchy of rights, there may, as this case shows, be a tension between
equality provisions concerning religious discrimination and those concerning
sexual orientation. Where this is so, Standard 7 of the National Minimum Stan-
dards for Fostering and the Statutory Guidance indicate that it must be taken into
account and in this limited sense the equality provisions concerning sexual
orientation should take precedence ( 93).
The court did not explain how there was a substantive tension-that is,
conflict-between the religious rights of the Johnses and their ability to
provide loving care to any child who was placed with them.
However, the court went out of its way to take stock of the public
authority's emphasis on
the need to value diversity and promote equality and to value, encourage and
support children in a non-judgmental way, regardless of their sexual orientation or
preference. That duty does not apply only to the child and the individual place-
ment, but to the wider context, including the main foster carer, a child's parents
and the wider family, any of whom may be homosexual. In these circumstances it
is quite impossible to maintain that a local authority is not entitled to consider a
prospective foster carer's views on sexuality, least of all when, as here, it is
apparent that the views held, and expressed, by the claimants might well affect
their behaviour as foster carers. This is not a prying intervention into mere belief.
Neither the local authority nor the court is seeking to open windows into people's
souls. The local authority is entitled to explore the extent to which prospective
foster carers' beliefs may affect their behaviour, their treatment of a child being
fostered by them ( 97).
Upon considering the language of the court, then, it appears that attempt-
ing to use the vehicle of education properly to form children, their conscien-
ces, their actions, and their reason so that they are equipped to distinguish
right from wrong, good from bad, is not necessarily appropriate if this kind of
education interferes with the drive to "encourage and support children in a
non-judgmental way, regardless of their sexual orientation or preference."
Instruction in virtue is out; a questionable form of education that promotes
exaggerated autonomy is the objective. The love and education that Mr. and
Mrs. Johns were prepared to provide (and had offered in the past) did not suit
the new standard of loving care and the means of education that supports it.
The court then delved into the question of what is religious discrimination
and whether it existed in this case. The court opined that Mr. and Mrs. Johns
are protected against direct and indirect discrimination against their religious
beliefs ( 98). The substance of the conflict over religious issues concerned
the distinction between (1) their views on sexuality and sexual orientation and
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(2) their religious beliefs ( 98). For the court, the two were separate rather
than intertwined. On this score, the court failed to comprehend the very
matter that defined Mr. and Mrs. Johns as solid citizens who cared for their
neighbor. It was incapable of acknowledging that the Johnses' views on
sexuality were inextricably related to and grounded upon their religious
beliefs-beliefs held by many co-religionists who identify with the moniker
Christian. The court disposed of the religious freedom questions in this
fashion:
If the defendant's treatment is the result of the claimants' expressed antipathy,
objection to, or disapproval of homosexuality and same-sex relationships it is
clear, on authorities which bind us, namely the decisions of the Court of Appeal in
Ladele and McFarlane, that it would not be because of their religious belief.
Moreover, the defendant's treatment of the claimants would not be less favourable
than that afforded other persons who, for reasons other than the religious views of
the claimants, expressed objection to, or disapproval of, homosexuality and same-
sex relationships contrary to the National Minimum Standards for Fostering and
the defendant's various policies ( 99).
In taking stock of the civil authority's attitude on the relationship and
tension between religious beliefs and views on human sexuality, the court
asserted that requiring respect and positive attitudes towards homosexuality
and same-sex relationships is not indirectly discriminatory against persons
holding certain religious beliefs ( 101). Furthermore, legislation and the
accompanying regulatory schemes "amount to a justification" ( 101). So,
how does this perspective score with reliance upon the Johnses' claims under
Article 9 of the ECHR?
The court stated that Article 9 provides only a "qualified" right to maintain
and exercise religious belief. Hence, interference with religious practices in
spheres of employment and other areas are easily justifiable ( 102). In
particular, the court concluded that this "will be particularly so where a per-
son in whose care a child is placed wishes to manifest a belief that is inimical
to the interests of children, 36 ( 102). Why and how such manifestation of
religious, Christian belief is inimical to the interests of children is neither
explained nor justified. The court defended its position by asserting that
"there is no right to foster" ( 103). Relying on material that it knew was "not
strictly evidence," the court opined that a child or young person who is homo-
sexual or is doubtful about his or her sexual orientation "may experience
isolation and fear of discovery" if the foster parent to whom this child is
36 Italics added. For this proposition the court cited R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State
for Education and Employment, [2005] A.C. (2nd series) 246.
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assigned "is antipathetic to or disapproves of homosexuality or same-sex
relationships" ( 106). But it would be reasonable to assume that the officials
who make the assignment would have the responsibility of screening not just
prospective foster parents but also the children who will be the subjects of the
appointments the officials make. In this regard, it would also be reasonable to
assume that these officials would have to make many decisions based on the
information available to them that an assignment of a child to a particular
foster parent or parents would be a good match for the parents and the child.
The fact that potential foster parents, for example, the Johnses, may actually
help a child better understand human nature and the essence of being a person
was immaterial to the court's consideration. What matters is whether the child
will be entrusted to the care of those who agree that homosexuality-or any
sexual relations other than those between a married man and woman-is right
and proper.
It was not, the court indicated, material or relevant as regards these crucial
legal issues to determine if the perspective that fosters and promotes homo-
sexuality is supported by competent research. The court insisted that such
matters were "not the point"-but it was the point to conclude and assert that
"attitudes to homosexuality and same-sex relationships of a person who has
applied to be a foster carer" are a reasonable and appropriate inquiry ( 106).
Whether there is any indication or suggestion that a child is homosexual or is
inclined to homosexuality or has any strong views on sexuality was not,
apparently, material to the court. What is material is that the child be exposed
to homosexuality in a sympathetic and embracing fashion. As the Johnses
could not agree with this position because of their Christian beliefs, they were
found to be unacceptable candidates for foster caring. Of course this again
begs another question: who would be acceptable?
V. AN EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S OPINION
As was mentioned in Section II above, the court did not address several
critical issues from international law that having a bearing and application on
the Johns case. Here I contend that the High Court's inability to consider the
import of the international instruments to which the United Kingdom is a
party resulted in the sort of injustice that the ICCPR and the ICESCR were
promulgated to prevent. As previously mentioned, the UDHR, the ICCPR,
and the ICESCR recognize the rights of parents-including those charged by
the law to be guardians of children-in the context of education dealing with
religious and moral matters. These were precisely the rights that the Johnses
sought to exercise. Although the United Kingdom is a party to the ICCER and
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the ICESCR-the juridical means for implementing the UDHR-their
provisions are not part of the United Kingdom's internal law.
What do these texts say about parents' rights? Let us begin with Article
26(3) of the UDHR, which states that, "Parents have a prior right to choose
the kind of education that shall be given to their children. 37 This language is
amplified and explicated by the ICCPR which states in Article 18(4) that
"States Parties ... undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and,
when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education
of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 38
Article 13(3) of the ICESCR similarly states that
States Parties ... undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when
applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those
established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational
standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.39
In both cases, these provisions protect the non-derogable rights40 of parents
to ensure the religious and moral education of the children entrusted to their
care. This is precisely the right that the Johnses attempted to exercise but
were prevented from exercising. The denial of their rights arose from the
preference the authorities gave to matters of sexual orientation over religious
liberty and parental authority.
As was mentioned in Section IV above, the Johns court stated:
While as between the protected rights concerning religion and sexual orientation
there is no hierarchy of rights, there may, as this case shows, be a tension between
equality provisions concerning religious discrimination and those concerning
sexual orientation. Where this is so, Standard 7 of the National Minimum Stan-
dards for Fostering and the Statutory Guidance indicate that it must be taken into
account and in this limited sense the equality provisions concerning sexual
orientation should take precedence ( 93).
However, it is clear from the action taken that the court and the public
authorities involved in the Johns case did in fact establish a hierarchy of
rights and gave precedence to one over the other, a precedence that is in
conflict with the law of nations to which the United Kingdom is a party even
37 UDHR, supra note 11.
38 ICCPR, supra note 9.
39 ICESCR, supra note 10.
40 ICCPR, art. 4, supra note 9; ICESCR, art. 5, supra note 10.
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though the covenantal language is not incorporated into its domestic law. The
public authorities involved in the Johns case, including the High Court, could
have easily identified an obligation to respect parental rights and respon-
sibilities in accordance with the principles contained in the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), which provides an accurate
and authentic understanding and application of international legal instruments
based on the principle ofgoodfaith.4 1
The provisions of international law dealing with parental rights and
responsibilities begin with and are built upon the principle of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights that the family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to be protected by society and the State.42
This principle is essentially duplicated in the ICCPR43 and the ICESCR.4 4
Moreover, the UDHR also acknowledges that parents have the prior right to
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.45 The
ICCPR builds on this point and further elaborates that States have a duty to
respect the liberty of parents (or legal guardians) to ensure that the religious
and moral education of their children is in conformity with the parents'
convictions.46
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (January 27, 1980),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/viennaconvention.html. Article 26 of
the treaty, which bears the heading "Pacta sunt servanda" (Agreements must be
observed), states, "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." In the section dealing with interpretation of treaties,
Article 31 specifies that treaty interpretation is also to be conducted in good faith. The
United Kingdom ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on June 25,
1971.
42 UDHR, supra note 11.
43 ICCPR, art. 23.1, supra note 9. ("The family is the fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.")
44 ICESCR, art. 10.1, supra note 10. ("The widest possible protection and assistance
should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and
education of dependent children.").
41 UDHR, art. 26.3, supra note 11.
46 ICCPR, art. 18.4, supra note 9. The ICESCR, art. 13(3), supra note 10, reflects these
points by stating that the duty of the State also includes respecting the liberty of parents to
send their children to schools (as long as they conform to the minimal educational standards
of the State) other than those established by public authorities and to ensure the religious
and moral education of children in conformity with the parents' convictions. In addition, the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 5, acknowledges that States parties "shall
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents ... to provide in a manner consistent
with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise
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For the High Court in the Johns case, it should have been essential that
these juridical texts be appreciated together and simultaneously considered
and applied in accordance with the principles of treaty application contained
in the Vienna Convention. Adherence to these principles would have contri-
buted to fidelity to the law and reduced the likelihood of international respon-
sibility for breaches of the law. Good-faith compliance requires this. More-
over, application of these principles would have protected the legitimate inter-
ests and rights of good people like the Johnses, for whom these texts were
promulgated.
As one works through the text of the Vienna Convention, it becomes
apparent that its drafters had in mind a functional and pragmatic approach to
applying international legal texts. It asserts the fundamental and universal
obligation that any instrument is to be read in good faith.47 Even the most
clever, resourceful explanation that complies with other principles-such as
giving precedence to sexual orientation matters that are not covered by the
ICCPR or the ICESCR-should fail if it is not proffered in the context of
good faith. Good faith in the Johns case means recognizing not only the rights
of this couple as religious people but as guardians who have the further right
of instructing the children entrusted to their care in a fashion that reflects the
parents' moral concerns.
Upon applying these principles to the issues under investigation, including
the international responsibility of the United Kingdom, it can be seen that
laws designed to protect parental rights in the education and moral upbringing
of children are consistent with the objectives of promoting human rights, as
enshrined in completely unambiguous human rights instruments. The decision
in Johns substantially interferes with and frustrates the protection of the legal
interests of parents-something to which the United Kingdom publicly
committed when it ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
The observation about good faith raises the related question as to what the
UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR mean to the citizen of the international
community. The plain or ordinary meaning of the provisions addressing
parents' rights, liberties, and duties is that parents do have rights and respon-
sibilities regarding their children. Ignoring these provisions would not be
consistent with the ordinary meaning of the applicable texts and would impair
the valid interests of parents. When one studies the working papers, the
travaux prdparatoires, of the UDHR, it becomes unmistakable that the
objectives and intention of Article 26.3 of the UDHR, as further reflected in
of the child of the rights recognized" by the CRC. 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 47 (Sept. 2, 1990),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm
47 See note 41, supra.
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Article 18.4 of the ICCPR and Article 13.3 of the ICESCR, were drafted to
avoid situations like those of Nazi Germany in which the State and the
controlling political party, but not the parents, determined how children were
to be educated and reared.48 In short, parents have and retain this prior right
that is consistent with the best interests of their children, and this right of
parents is guaranteed by the rule of law.
If the High Court had acknowledged the state's duty to respect the rights
of the Johnses in their application to become foster parents once again, the
decision would have been consistent with a good faith application of the
UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR based on the plain meaning of their
language as well as their goals and underlying motivations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the principles designed to protect the international rights of
parents in educating children, particularly in the realm of moral and religious
matters, would have reinvigorated important principles underlying the noble
work of the international legal community as defined by law. Respect for
these principles also would have substantially contributed to real diversity, a
value to which the court in Johns gave mere lip service.
In addition, the Johns decision raises grave questions about the propriety
of courts actually deciding cases that they say they are not deciding, but in
fact decide in the abstract. By essentially deciding the case, the court exer-
cised jurisdiction in a fashion that bodes ill insofar as what it has said about
important issues may have a chilling effect when couples like Mr. and Mrs.
Johns learn that the rights of religious freedom will be given, at best,
secondary consideration when compared to rights dealing with "sexual iden-
tity" or "sexual autonomy."
Furthermore, perhaps without intent, the Johns court has minimized the
significance of fundamental rights identified and guaranteed under interna-
tional law by marginalizing the religious and parental concerns of the
Johnses. This decision is a component of a growing body of jurisprudence in
which authentic and legitimate religious belief and the exercise of this belief
are considered unacceptable by those who hold power of the state and the
culture that the state promotes.
I have labored to show a way in which the United Kingdom and other
members of the international legal community can prevent violations of their
48 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 159 (2001); MORSINK, supra note 12.
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acknowledged international responsibility when it comes to the rights of
parents and guardians in educating children. What is needed is fidelity to the
mandates contained in all applicable law and insurance that these norms are
incorporated into applicable domestic law-for this is where their meaning
will become manifest. With this consideration in mind, the ability of the
members of the international legal community to be true to their noble man-
dates can be strengthened. Through a respectful and objective use of the
foundational texts, states such as the United Kingdom have the best chance of
accomplishing the many dignified goals that they were established to realize.
But by ignoring these texts and their faithful meaning, they put at risk the rule
of law and vitiate rights designed to protect the fundamental unit of human
society.
